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ABSTRACT
In this paper we examine the behavior of interest rates and exchange rates following a variety of
shocks to the international monetary system. Our analysis suggests that real interest rates in the US
and Europe will remain low relative to historical experience for an extended period but converge
slowly toward normal levels. During this adjustment interval, the US absorbs a disproportionate
share of world savings. After a substantial initial appreciation of floating currencies relative to the
dollar,  the  dollar  and  other  floating  currencies  remain  constant  relative  to  each  other.  An
improvement in the investment climate in Europe during the adjustment period would generate an
immediate depreciation of the euro relative to the dollar. In real terms, the dollar and the floating
currencies will eventually have to depreciate relative to the managed currencies. But most of the
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In this paper we set out in greater detail how we think about the emergence of 
China and Asia as major players in world capital and foreign exchange markets.   
Our approach, which has come to be known as Bretton Woods II, provides a 
coherent explanation for the current structure of interest rates, exchange rates 
and current account balances.  The framework developed below also provides a 




Conventional analyses are based on the assertion that the BW II system cannot 
hold together for much longer.  This may or may not turn out to be correct but it 
does not offer any guidance if the system does survive for an extended time 
period, as we believe it will. 
     
   
For simplicity, our framework divides the world into three regions, emerging Asia, 
the US, and Euroland.
2  Euroland includes all countries outside the US with open 
capital markets and market-determined exchange rates. We will use the euro to 
stand  for  the  currencies  of  these  countries  since  it  is  the  dominant  currency 
among them.  Asia includes all countries with relatively closed capital markets 
and  managed  exchange  rates  and  we  use  the  renminbi  to  stand  in  for  their 
currencies.   
 
Some observers have questioned the usefulness of aggregating the managed 
rate countries into a single zone because of the differing incentives and 
constraints facing these countries.  We agree, for example, that current account 
surpluses and reserve gains for China, oil-exporting countries and Japan are 
products of quite different developments and incentives and are likely to have 
different degrees of persistence over time (see Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and 
Garber, 2005 pp.158-160).  Our forecast is that individual countries will join and 
exit the bloc of countries that manage their dollar exchange rates, and their 
management will find different degrees of success, but the bloc will nevertheless 
remain a lasting and economically important feature of the international monetary 
system.
3    
 
 
                                                       
1 See Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber, 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c. 
2 Because there is no necessity of geographic contiguity, we have referred to these regions in other essays from the 
functional viewpoint as the trade account region, the center country, and the capital account region. 
3 We have consistently argued that the system, not its current manifestation, would last for the foreseeable future, “Fixed 
exchange rates and controlled financial markets work for twenty years and countries that follow this development strategy 
become an important periphery.  These development policies are then overtaken by open financial markets and this, in 
turn, requires floating exchange rates. The Bretton Woods system does not evolve, it just occasionally reloads a 
periphery.” (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber, 2003, p 3).      
 The analysis will lean on four assumptions.  We believe these assumptions are 
realistic, and they dramatically simplify the dynamics of a three-region analysis: 
  
1. Asian financial markets are assumed to be poorly integrated with the other two 
regions because of capital controls and the threat of sovereign interference with 
capital flows.   This allows Asia to manage the dollar-renminbi exchange rate so 
that the renminbi appreciates in real terms slowly over an adjustment period of 
many years. 
 
2. The US and Euroland financial markets, in contrast, are assumed to be very 
well integrated and their respective assets very close substitutes, an assumption 
consistent with a great deal of empirical work.  The US and Euroland do not 
manage the euro-dollar exchange rate. 
 
3. The dominant change in the economic environment that is driving the main 
features of the world economy is the rapid growth of savings rates and the level 
of savings in Asia and their exportation to the rest of the world.   
 
4. The US and Euroland differ in their capacities to utilize Asian savings, with the 
US having a much greater absorptive capacity. 
 
Some  of  the  significant  departures  of  our  analysis  from  the  conventional 
approach include the following: 
 
1a.  Conventional  analysis  considers  Asian  financial  markets  sufficiently 
integrated with international markets so that Asian governments will not be able 
to manage real exchange rates at reasonable costs.  Moreover, they will not want 
to distort real exchange rates for much longer to encourage export-led growth. 
 
2a. Conventional analysis assumes that US and Euroland financial markets are 
not  well  integrated.  Diversification  of  Asian  reserves  is  thought  to  have  an 
important effect on the dollar-euro exchange rate. This assumption seems to us 
inconsistent with substantial evidence that intervention and reserve management 
by US and Euroland authorities have not had a large or lasting effect on industrial 
country exchange rates. 
 
3a.  The  conventional  analysis  usually  identifies  a  fall  in  the  US  household 
savings rate or a rise in the government fiscal deficit rate as the driving force 
behind the US current account deficit.    
 
4a. Interest rate movements have not been consistent with this assumption—
falling  instead  of  rising.    To  circumvent  this  contradiction,  it  is  conventionally 
asserted that interest rates and asset prices are driven by incorrect expectations, 
a misunderstanding of the dangerous nature of the system, or bubbles. 
 
 The  interesting  results  of  our  analysis  following  a  sudden,  long-term  rise  in 
exports of Asian savings include: 
 
·  There  is  a  substantial  immediate  appreciation  of  the  euro  against  the 
dollar. 
·   Real interest rates in the US and Euroland remain low relative to historical 
experience  but  converge  slowly  toward  normal  rates  as  Asian  markets 
become integrated with international markets. 
·  The dollar and the euro gradually depreciate relative to the renminbi but, 
after the initial euro appreciation vs. the dollar, remain constant relative to 
each other. 
·  More rapid expected growth in Europe would depreciate the euro relative 
to the dollar and renminbi and raise interest rates in the US and Europe. 
·  More rapid expected growth in the US would tend to depreciate the dollar 
relative  to  the  euro  and  renminbi.  Because  the  dollar–renminbi  is 
managed,  the  dollar  would  not  fall  immediately  but  would  begin  to 
depreciate more rapidly. The euro would appreciate immediately and then 
match the dollar’s more rapid rate of depreciation against the renminbi. 
·  Shifts  in  currency  composition  of  Asian  reserves  from  dollars  to  euros 
would have little or no lasting effect on dollar-euro exchange rates. 
·  Effective protection in the US and Euroland or a fall in the savings rate in 
Asia  would  generate a  stronger dollar  in  the  long  run.  The  immediate 
effect would be less rapid dollar depreciation against the renminbi.  The 
euro could go either way against the dollar. 
·  A decision by Asian governments to manage their exchange rates relative 
to  a  dollar/euro  basket  would  reduce  the  volatility  of  the  dollar-euro 
exchange rate but not its current or long term level. 
·  In real terms, the dollar will eventually have to depreciate relative to the 
renminbi.  But most of the adjustment in the US trade account will come 
as  US  absorption  responds  to  increases  in  real  interest  rates.    Slow 
adjustment in the composition of US output toward traded goods over an 
extended time period will not require unprecedented dollar depreciation. 
·  High oil prices and high consumption by oil exporters would generate a 
slower rate of dollar depreciation against the renminbi and higher interest 








In our framework, the fundamental shock to the system is a change in the supply 
of savings from Asia and a suspension of the usual home bias in allocating these 
savings across world  markets.   It may not seem all that important to decide 
whether it was because US savings fell or Asian savings increased to drive the pattern  of  current  accounts  we  now  see.    But  it  is,  in  fact,  crucial  for 
understanding the system and the direction it will take.   
 
The first obvious departure from the conventional analysis is the observation that 
Asian real exchange rates are not market-determined prices but are heavily and 
successfully managed by Asian governments.  As noted above, the conventional 
analysis assumes this troublesome fact will soon go away.  We argue that this 
policy  behavior  will  eventually  go  away  but  is  a  central  feature  of  Asian 
development policies and will not dissipate for a long time.  It follows that if the 
rest of the world is to adjust now to a savings shock emanating from Asia the 
primary adjustment mechanism will not be changes in Asian real exchange rates.   
 
To manage real exchange rates, Asian governments must intervene in foreign 
exchange  markets.    That  part  of  the  intervention  that  is  sterilized  is,  in  fact, 
intervention  in  credit  markets.    Asian  finance  ministries  or  central  banks  sell 
domestic securities reducing the supply of loanable funds to domestic borrowers 
and buy foreign securities, thereby increasing the supply of loanable funds in the 
US and Euroland. The resulting shift in interest differential is possible because of 
effective  capital  controls.   That  is,  Asian  governments  can manage  exchange 
rates  and  interest  rates  because  their  domestic  assets  are  made  imperfect 
substitutes  for  foreign  assets  in  private  portfolios  by  policy,  if  not  by  private 
preference.   
 
Because Asian exchange rates are managed, adjustment must proceed through 
current  account  balances  and  real  interest  rates.    To  understand  current 
accounts we have to understand savings and investment.  The question is: how 
are  savings  and  investment  changed  in  the  US,  Euroland  and  elsewhere  as 
Asian  savings  are  offered  to  the  rest  of  the  world?    In  particular,  can  we 
understand why real interest rates might fall in both the US and Euroland while 
current account balances adjust by very different amounts?  In our view, this is a 




We can illustrate our approach first with a set of figures focusing on interest rates 
and current accounts for Asia, the US, and Euroland and then with another set 
focusing on net foreign debt positions and exchange rates.   
 
Figure 1 shows real interest rates for the US, Euroland, and Asia on the vertical 
axes.  The horizontal axes are the current accounts for these three regions. The 
upward sloping curves labeled S are national savings. The curves labeled S’ are 
national savings augmented by imports or exports of savings.  The downward 
sloping curves labeled I are investment. For convenience, we start with balanced 
current  accounts  at  a  common  interest  rate,  but  any  starting  point  for  the 
separate economies will do as long as real rates are the same in the US and 
Euroland.   
 
A policy to divert Asian savings to the US and Euroland reduces the supply of 
savings available in Asia and shifts the Asian supply curve to the left.  A current 
account surplus is generated and interest rates in Asia rise.   
 
In the US and Euroland, savings supply curves shift to the right as Asian savings 
push in.  The real interest rate in the US and Euroland falls as we move down the 
investment demand curves.  The demand curves are downward sloping because 
investment increases relative to domestic savings as interest rates fall. Moreover, 
consumption rises with a fall in interest rates so domestic savings fall as well.  
The  rise  in  consumption  and  investment  is  matched  by  an  inflow  of  foreign 
savings and the current account deficit increases.  The increase in Asia’s current 
account surplus is matched by the sum of the increases in the current account 
deficits of the US and Euroland. 
 
In the US, the increase in savings demanded is large because investment and 
savings  are  quite  sensitive  to  the  rate  of  interest.
4    Euroland  sees  the  same 
                                                       
4 This means that there are many viable projects or confident consumers ready to go  with a small improvement in 
financing costs relative to Euroland. 
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Deficit  Surplus qualitative changes. But investment and the current account deficit increase only 
slightly  because  there  are  few  profitable  investment  opportunities  and 
consumption is not very responsive.  The fundamental factor driving the different 
responses  of  the  US  and  Euroland  current  account  deficits  is  the  different 
opportunities to efficiently utilize foreign savings as the interest rate falls in both 
regions.  
 
An important aspect of the adjustment process is the equalization of real rates of 
return  on  capital  invested  in  the  US  and  Euroland  through  private  arbitrage.  
When we turn to exchange rate determination below, we will use the result that 
real interest rates are equalized by flows of savings.  It is clear, however, that 
expected rates of return on capital in the US and Euroland could be equalized by 
expected real exchange rate changes in addition to real interest rates.   
 
This apparent indeterminacy between real interest rates and expected changes 
in real exchange rates during the adjustment period is resolved at the end of the 
period.  When the new equilibrium is established there is no reason to predict 
that the real exchange rate between the euro and the dollar would continue to 
change over time.  Since the capital stocks must have the same expected rate of 
return looking forward at the end of the adjustment period, it follows that real 
interest rates must be the same at that time.  Arbitrage across time will ensure 
that any capital put in place in the US and Euroland during the adjustment period 
that will remain in place in a new steady state must have the same rate of return.     
 
The  optimal  policy  over  time  for  Asian  governments  is  to  allow  gradual  real 
exchange rate appreciation.  This reduces over time their intervention in credit 
markets and their exports of savings.  By the end of the adjustment period real 
interest rates will have equalized across the three regions. 
 
We  now  turn  to  the  foreign  exchange  markets.    There  are  three  keys  to 
understanding the three cross exchange rates.   
 
First, for some years, Asian governments can and will manage the real dollar 
value of their currencies.  They can do so because capital controls make Asian 
domestic  assets  imperfect  substitutes  for  US  and  Euroland  assets  in  private 
portfolios. Their ability to manage their real exchange rate will erode over time as 
capital  controls  become  less  effective  and  their  domestic  asset  markets  are 
integrated with international capital markets. Their desire to maintain the system 
will also erode as their surplus labor is absorbed. But they will manage rates as 
long  as  they  can  because  undervaluation  is  an  important  part  of  their 
development strategy. 
  
Second, in the long run, say ten years more or less, the real value of the three 
currencies will have to adjust to changes in the international investment positions 
of the three regions generated during the adjustment period.  Asia’s net asset position  will  improve  while  the  US  and  Euroland  positions  will  deteriorate  by 
relatively large and small amounts, respectively.   
 
The relationship between the long run exchange rate and the net foreign debt 
position of each region is not controversial.  As net foreign debt increases, larger 
trade  balance  surpluses  are  needed  to  service  net  debt  (balance  the  current 
account).  So a fall in net foreign assets is associated with a depreciation of the 
real  exchange  rate.    The  implication  is  that  the  dollar  and  the  euro  must 
depreciate  against  the  renminbi,  but  the  dollar  must  depreciate  by  more.  
Therefore, the dollar must depreciate against the euro.
5 
 
Third, exchange rates today would normally reflect these long run expectations to 
some degree.  But intervention by Asian governments is sufficient to manage 
strictly the dollar-renminbi exchange rate.  Intervention will not keep the renminbi 
undervalued  forever,  but  it  can  extend  the  adjustment  period.    As  we  have 
argued  elsewhere,  the  optimal  path  (from  China’s  perspective)  for  Asian  real 
exchange rates is a gradual appreciation toward their new long run values.   
 
In contrast, the euro cross-rates both today and along the adjustment path are 
determined by private investors.  The relevant context for these portfolio choices 
is that dollar and euro assets are perfect substitutes.
6  The key implication is that 
once the system comes to be understood the euro and the dollar must depreciate 
at the same rate over time relative to the renminbi.  Recall that real interest rates 
on capital invested in the US and Euroland are equalized by net savings flows.  It 
follows  that  investors  must  expect  the  euro-dollar  exchange  rate  to  remain 
unchanged.  Put another way both currencies must depreciate, and be expected 
to depreciate, at the same rate against the renminbi.   
 
The  result  of  a  shift  in  Asian  savings  exports  is  then  an  immediate  euro 
appreciation  against  the  dollar  and  the  renminbi  followed  by  a  constant 
dollar/euro  rate.    This  means  that  there  will  be  immediate,  maximal  political 
pressure  for  relief  in  a  Euroland  unable  to  absorb  the  shock  easily  and 
continuous, though declining, pressure thereafter. 
 
These  results are  illustrated  in  Figure 2.  Starting from an  initial  value  of  the 
renminbi-dollar  rate  in  the  top  panel  and  a  renminbi-euro  rate  in  the  bottom 
panel, we can follow the effects of an increase in Asian savings and intervention.  
The increase in savings and intervention raises interest rates in Asia and lowers 
 
                                                       
5 In our view, the amount of the eventual dollar depreciation is often overestimated.  Recall that the primary factor driving 
the  increase  in  the  US  trade  and  current  account  deficit  is  the  relatively  strong  response  of  US  investment  and 
consumption to a decline in interest rates.  Over the adjustment period interest rates will rise, thereby causing an equally 
strong reverse effect; and this will help reduce the US deficit.  The exchange rate adjustment therefore must be consistent 
with a slow shift in US output toward traded goods.  
 
6 See Henderson and Leahy (2005) for a three country analysis of intervention where imperfect asset substitution is 
assumed for all three regions.    
 
interest rates in the US and Euroland.  Asia generates a current account surplus 
matched by deficits in the US and Euroland.  This continues until Asian savings 
and intervention return to normal levels.  In Figure 2, this interval is from 0 - T.  
The eventual fall in the dollar against the renminbi from A to B is required to 
generate the trade surplus needed to service the higher level of US debt at time 













Exchange Rates Without intervention, we would expect an immediate depreciation of the dollar; 
but this can and will be delayed by intervention.
7  Along the adjustment path AB, 
the dollar is supported by a flow of intervention.  Private investors know the dollar 
will depreciate but nevertheless are willing to hold the stock of dollars, reduced 
by Asian purchases of US assets.
8  US debt to foreigners is growing more rapidly 
than it would have if the fall in interest rates had been partially offset by a market-
determined depreciation of the dollar.    
    
The  renminbi-euro  rate  starts  at  C  and  must  eventually  move  to  D,  a  much 
smaller depreciation.  Like the US, Euroland will accumulate debt (or reduce net 
assets below their previous path) during the adjustment period.  But in this case 
Asian governments are not intervening to manage the exchange rate either at 
point C or along the adjustment path. The question is then: where will the market 
set euro exchange rates?  
 
We  can  make  our  analysis  more  realistic  and  much  more  transparent  by 
assuming that US and Euroland assets are close substitutes in private portfolios.  
This is an important departure from the usual portfolio balance model because it 
implies  that  the  currency  composition  of  Asian  intervention  is  of  secondary 
importance.  If euro and dollar assets are close substitutes in private portfolios, 
Asian  governments  could  intervene  in  either  dollars  or  euros  to  stabilize  the 
dollar value of their currencies.  Moreover, diversification of Asian reserves would 
have little or no lasting effect on the dollar-euro exchange rates, contrary to a key 
conclusion  of  the  conventional  view.
9  The  irrelevance  of  Asian  reserve 
diversification  is  consistent  with  a  very  large  body  of  empirical  evidence  that 
sterilized  intervention  has  had  no  lasting  effect  on  exchange  rates  among 
industrial countries.
10   
 
The practical importance of this assumption is that the two adjustment paths in 
Figure  2  must  have  the  same  slope.    If  they  did  not,  more  rapid  dollar 
depreciation  against  the  renminbi,  relative  to  euro  depreciation  against  the 
renminbi, implies expected depreciation of the dollar against the euro.  Since 
interest rates in the US and Euroland are the same, arbitrage would be profitable.  
Private investors would immediately bid for euros against dollars and would do 
so  until  the  euro  jumps  to  E.    From  this  initial  appreciation  the  euro  now 
depreciates against the renminbi at the same rate as the dollar.  Note that along 
                                                       
7 We could replace time with net debt on the horizontal axis and have a diagram similar to that presented in Blanchard, 
Giavazzi and Sa (2005).  The case we present here is similar to their discussion of intervention following a shift in 
preferences away from US goods.  The interested reader is encouraged to work through their analysis of an imperfect 
substitutes model.  Their analysis assumes that interest rates are unchanged and changes in absorption are assumed to 
be related to fiscal policies 
8The portfolio balance equilibrium is based on the idea that residents of all countries prefer home assets but can be 
moved away from their preferred portfolio by differences in expected yields, that is, by interest differentials adjusted for 
expected changes in exchange rates.  
9 See Eichengreen (2005).   
10 We have also explored the effects of diversification under the assumption of imperfect substitution between dollar and 
euro assets.  Our conclusion was that it is not in the interests of Asian governments to diversify and recent data from the 
IMF shows that they have not done so through the end of last year.  See Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber, 2004a. 
The argument presented here suggests that Asian governments can diversify if they choose to do so but that this would 
have no lasting effect on dollar exchange rates. this adjustment path the euro remains “overvalued” relative to the dollar and the 
renminbi  throughout  the  adjustment  interval,  although  the  degree  of 
overvaluation shrinks over time.    
 
We  can  now  iterate  through  the  current  account  analysis.    The  euro  has 
appreciated against the renminbi and the dollar, so Euroland’s current account 
deficit, already increased by the fall in interest rates, tends to widen.  The dollar 
is unchanged against the renminbi and has depreciated against the euro so the 
already increased US current account deficit is reduced.  The Asian surplus is 
increased by the euro’s appreciation.  These second round effects on the current 
account positions of the three regions would not alter our basic story assuming 
the  reactions  of  absorption  to  interest  rates  is  very  different  in  the  US  and 
Euroland. 
 
Where Are We Now? 
 
The discussion above suggests that the dollar should have depreciated against 
the euro when market participants realized that US imports of savings from Asia 
would generate a substantial increase in US net investment income payments.  
But there has been no obvious correspondence between the US current account 
deficit or the increase in net US international debt and the value of the dollar.  
The  current  account  deteriorated  sharply  and  net  debt  began  to  grow  at  a 
historically unprecedented rate in 1996 but the dollar was strong until 2002.   
 
One explanation is found in Chart 1, which shows US net investment income 
payments.  As of mid 2004 the US still earned more on its stock of gross financial 
assets than it paid on its larger stock of gross international debt.  Indeed, in the 
eight most recent quarters, Q2/2003-Q1/2005, US net earnings totaled $86 billion 
compared to $47 billion in the previous eight quarters.   
 
The  lesson  is  clear:  it  is  not  enough  to forecast  changes  in  the  US  net  debt 
position but also stocks of gross international assets and liabilities and rates of 
return on these stocks. Our framework suggests that over time the growth in net 
US debt will generate net investment payments in part because we expect net 
debt to grow and US interest rates to rise over the adjustment period.  But we 
also expect very substantial capital gains on US owned foreign direct investment 
and this tends to limit the growth in the market value of US net debt and reduces 
net  investment  income  payments.    Expectations  of  the  long  run  value  of  net 
investment income payments require a difficult evaluation of the evolution of net 
and gross investment positions and rates of return.
11   
 
Moreover, it would not be surprising if market participants were uncertain about 
the durability of US deficits.  The conventional story still insists that a speculative 
                                                       
11 See  Gourinchas and Rey, (August 2005)  for a detailed breakdown of the denomination of US gross foreign  assets 
and liabilities. attack on Asian currencies that will force a revaluation is long past due.  If it had 
occurred, the path for US debt would have already started to reverse 
 
Perhaps the best way to link the analysis with the experience of the past ten 
years is to assume that, as the US deficit has moved to a historically high level 
and  stayed  there  for  an  extended  period,  market  participants  have  placed 
increased weight on the probability that the very gradual appreciation of Asian 
currencies requires the substantial near-term rise of the euro against the dollar 
described above.  It would not be surprising if this learning process has some 
way to go.  If so, there may be periodic upward pressure on the euro. As the 
learning curve flattens, the euro should stabilize against the dollar. 
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Interest and Exchange Rates during Adjustment 
 
Of course, changes in many conditions will shift the dollar-euro exchange rates 
along  the  adjustment  path  set  out  in  the  previous  section.    The  framework 
developed  above  is  useful  to  evaluate  changes  in  the  economic  environment 
during  the  adjustment  process,  and  the  peculiar  nature  of  the  global  system 
produces some remarkable and unanticipated results.   
 
1. A Stronger Euroland Outlook 
 
Suppose, for example, that at time t1 an improved outlook for profits in Euroland 
generates a positive shift in the demand for investment in Euroland.  Figure 1 suggests  that  Asian  savings  will  be  shifted  from  the  US  to  Euroland  for  the 
balance of the adjustment period and that interest rates in both regions will rise.   
 
The  effects  on  exchange  rates  are  illustrated  in  Figure  3.    With  more  Asian 
savings  going  to  Euroland  and  less  to  the  US,  at  the  end  of  the  adjustment 
period, at T, the euro will be weaker and the dollar stronger than would have 
been the case.  If Asian intervention at t1 keeps the dollar at F in Figure 3, the 
euro depreciates sharply at t1 for two reasons.  First, it must now reach level J at 
T and it must now depreciate more slowly to match the dollars reduced rate of 
depreciation.  
 
 2. A Weaker Euroland Outlook 
 
A weaker outlook for Euroland investment would have symmetric effects.  In this 
case there would be deterioration in the final expected debt position of the US 
and an improvement in the final debt position of Euroland.  This would require a 
more rapid rate of dollar depreciation against the renminbi and another move up 
for the euro.  Interest rates in both regions would fall. 
 
3. A Stronger US Outlook  
 
Changes in US growth and investment would have similar effects.  As US growth 
increases,  so  does  the  expected  stock  of  US  debt.    The  greater  long  run 
depreciation would not affect the current level of the renminbi-dollar but would 
require  a  more  rapid  appreciation  of  the  renminbi  against  the  dollar  for  the 
balance of the adjustment period.   
 
The euro would appreciate against the renminbi and the dollar for two reasons.  
First,  its  long  run  level  would  jump  up  and  it  would  have  to  appreciate 
immediately  in  order  to  match  the  dollar’s  higher  expected  depreciation  rate 
against the renminbi.  
 
This is illustrated in Figure 4.  The expected renminbi-dollar at T shifts down from 
G  to  B  and  the  expected  renminbi-euro  moves  up  from  D  to  K.    The  euro 
immediately jumps from H to I as again the change in the euro is amplified by 





A larger fiscal deficit and demand for capital following destruction of US capital 
increases  US  demand  for  foreign  savings  and  will  lead  to  an  increased  US 
indebtedness at T.  Therefore, scenario 3 analysis applies.  The euro appreciates 
against the dollar. 
 
 5. Protectionism Surges; Oil Exporters Start Consuming Asia’s Surplus Savings  
 
It turns out that all of these have the same impacts on interest and exchange 
rates.   
 
 5a. For example, effective protection against Asian exports in both the US 
and Euroland would reduce net savings transfers to the US and Euroland from 
Asia by forcing a reduction in Asia’s net trade surplus. 
   
5b.  Similarly,  a  decline  in  net  Asian  savings  exported  to  the  US  and 
Euroland would occur if a larger share of US, Euroland, and Asian income is 
transferred to oil exporters via terms of trade shifts.  As the oil exporters start to 
consume a high fraction of this transfer, fewer excess savings are available to 
accumulate US and Euroland debt.   
 
Each of these developments can be analyzed as illustrated in Figure 5.   
 
In these events expected US debt at T is reduced, which reduces the terminal 
exchange rate from B to G. Euroland debt also falls, which reduces the renminbi-
euro from D to K.  We assume that the new path for the renminbi-dollar does not 
jump up at t1, but the rate of dollar depreciation is reduced so that the new path 
for the renminbi-dollar is FG.  The renminbi-euro must reach K at T and the path 
from t1 must have the same slope as FG, that is, the renminbi-euro must have the 
same expected rate of depreciation as the renminbi-dollar.  The conclusion is 
that the euro can either depreciate or appreciate immediately against the dollar 
depending  on  the  relative  change  in  debt  stocks  in  response  to  the  new 
environment. There is no necessary direction of effect for this key exchange rate. 
Interest rates will rise both in the US and Euroland because of the reduction in 
available savings. 
 
A useful rule of thumb is that events that change expected US and Euroland debt 
stocks  and  real  exchange  rates  in  opposite  directions  generate  large  and 
immediate  changes  in  the  dollar/euro  rate  when  expectations  change.    The 
market rate changes in the same direction as the change in the expected future 
rates.  Events that move both expected debt stocks in the same direction have 
ambiguous effects on the exchange rate at the point where expectations change. 
 
6. A Basket Peg 
 
The results discussed above would be altered if Asian authorities adjusted the 
renminbi-dollar rate in reaction to changes in the dollar-euro rate.  An interesting 
change  would  be  adoption  of  a  basket  peg  by  the  Asian  authorities.    In  the 
absence of new shocks to the equilibrium path, a basket peg would have no 
effect because the dollar-euro exchange rate is constant during the adjustment 
period.  However, in the face of the other shocks discussed above, a basket peg 
would  tend  to  reduce  the  volatility  of  the  dollar-euro  rate  and  would  either increase or decrease the average real value of the renminbi depending on the 
nature of shocks.  There is no implication that a move from a straight dollar peg 



















































Further Thoughts on Asset Markets 
 
The  apparent  failure  of  dollar  exchange  rates  to  respond  to  unprecedented 
recent and projected US current account deficits is an important challenge for 
economic analysis.  It is generally agreed that a substantial increase in projected 
debt levels should be associated with expectations that the real exchange rate 
will  eventually  depreciate.    If  private  investors  regard  financial  assets 
denominated in different currencies and issued by residents of different countries 
as perfect or very close substitutes, then the current exchange rate should be 
tied to the expected future exchange rate through the interest parity condition.  
Taken together, these ideas suggest that the dollar should have declined several 
years  ago  against  the  floating  currencies  when  expectations  about  future  US 
debt levels were revised.   
 
Suppose, for example, that some event generates a forecast that US debt will 
increase from zero to sixty percent of US GDP and then stabilize at that level at 
some arbitrary future date, T.  Most analysts would agree that a real depreciation 
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t1 higher level of debt.
12  If the dollar is expected to be lower at T, if interest parity 
holds, and if real interest rates are not affected by the shock that generated the 
increase  in  expected  debt,  then  the  real  exchange  rate  must  depreciate 
immediately  and  by  the  same  amount  as  the  long  run  expected  value  when 
expectations change. 
 
Research  on  exchange  rates  since  the  early  1970s  has  been  dominated  by 
attempts to reconcile the data to this elementary notion.  In the early years of 
floating rates the question was why exchange rates were much more variable 
than reasonable estimates of long run expected values.  The current debate asks 
why market rates now are so stable in the face of strong presumption that the 
long run expectation has changed by a large amount.   
 
To be sure, the market could have gotten it wrong then and could be getting it 
wrong now.  If so, a crisis with sharply rising interest rates and sharply falling 
dollar exchange rates could be imminent, as conventional analysts predict.  But it 
seems  prudent  to  carefully  consider  alternative  possibilities  that  are  currently 




An Attempt to Reconcile Current Exchange Rates and Expectations  
 
Market exchange rates need not move in lock step with expected exchange rates 
if interest rates change or if interest rate parity does not hold.  An approach that 
was popular in the early 1980s to explain “excess volatility” of market exchange 
rates  explored  the  assumption  that  interest  parity  may  not  hold  if  assets 
denominated in different currencies or issued in different countries are not perfect 
substitutes.
13  That is, if residents of a country for some reason prefer domestic 
assets, they would have to be compensated with higher expected yields to move 
away from their preferred portfolio.  If rates of change toward a stable long run 
equilibrium varied, it follows that current exchange rates could be much more 
variable  than  long  run  expected  exchange  rates.    Moreover,  sterilized 
intervention alters relative supplies of securities and could have some influence 
on expected rates of change and the levels of exchange rates.       
 
In  the  current  context,  the  implications  of  this  portfolio  balance  approach  are 
straightforward.    If  foreign  residents  prefer  home  securities  and  those 
preferences  are  unchanged,  US  residents  must  pay  a  premium  to  finance  a 
current account deficit.  If we assume “domestic” interest rates are not affected 
by the shock that increases US foreign debt, foreign investors must be induced to 
hold  the  growing  stock  of  dollar-denominated  claims  on  the  US  by  an  extra 
expected return in the form of expected appreciation of the dollar.  Since at T the 
                                                       
12 See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2004, 2005 for discussion and evidence. 
 
13 See Branson and Henderson, 1985 for a survey. dollar has to be below its current level because of increased US indebtedness to 
foreigners and since it must be expected to appreciate from now to T, the dollar 
must depreciate by even more now.   
 
At first glance, this does not seem to help much in understanding the current 
situation where, it is argued, the dollar has not depreciated enough.  But this can 
be  rationalized  by  assuming  the  initial  shock  was  a  spontaneous  increase  in 
preferences for dollar assets. (Blanchard et al, 2005).  If foreigners want dollar 
assets,  they  can  obtain  them  through  current  account  surpluses  and  in  the 
interim will accept a lower expected yield on the dollar assets they do hold.  It 
follows that even though the dollar is expected to be lower at T it may not fall 
much initially because an expected depreciation is consistent with an otherwise 
unsatisfied demand for dollars during the adjustment period. 
 
 
Is Intervention a Plausible Driver of the System? 
 
Identifying plausible reasons for a shift in preferences toward dollars remains a 
serious  problem.
14    As  one  explanation,  if  changes  in  governments’  balance 
sheets  are  not  systematically  offset  by  private  investors  the  shift  in  currency 
preferences  could  be  associated  with  government  policies.    In  particular, 
sterilized  intervention  could  account  for  expected  increases  in  US  net 
international debt but only gradual adjustment in dollar exchange rates.   
 
 
But  there  are  a  number  of  reasons  that  the  portfolio  balance  approach  was 
placed on a back burner of the profession’s research agenda.  First, a very large 
empirical literature was unable to find any lasting effect of intervention on interest 
rates or exchange rates.  Second, imperfect substitution is usually modeled as 
aversion to exchange rate volatility.  But sensible estimates of the degree of risk 
aversion  needed  to  match  exchange  rate  data  seemed  implausible.    Third, 
imperfect substitution could be related to default risk or capital controls, but this 
has generally been assumed to be irrelevant for industrial countries.   
 
Finally, Dornbusch (1976) showed that monetary policy and associated changes 
in real interest rate differentials could account for exchange rate volatility with 
perfect substitution and stable long run expected values for real exchange rates.  
In an era where monetary policies were quite variable, this solved the theoretical 
puzzle of the day and moved portfolio balance models to the history of thought 
reading list.  
 
Nevertheless, it is clear that home bias in goods, equities and other financial 
assets remains a central fact and puzzle for international economics.
15  Obstfeld 
                                                       
14 Cooper (2001, 2004) offers a compelling argument for a change in private preferences for US assets.  We agree that 
this is part of the story but focus here on governments’ portfolio choices.   
15 See Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000). (2004) presents a thoughtful review of these issues and offers a guess that a 
new  theoretical  basis  for  the  portfolio  balance  approach  will  emerge  from  his 
work with Ken Rogoff on the implications of imperfect goods market integration.  
This would be welcome, but in the interim we remain largely in the dark about the 
source  of  home  bias  for  assets  and  its  implications  for  models  of  portfolio 
behavior. 
 
Our own home bias in these matters is that capital controls and the threat of 
sovereign interference with foreign investment is the most compelling argument 
behind  a  portfolio  balance  framework.
16    It  follows  that  the  portfolio  balance 
approach is more likely to be useful in understanding the behavior of countries or 
groups  of  countries  whose  governments  dominate  private  portfolio  decisions 
through controls and intervention and manage their exchange rates.   
 
In our framework, the shift in preferences toward dollars is not just qualitative but 
is  measured  by  increases  in  international  reserves  of  governments  managing 
their  exchange  rates.    Moreover,  sterilized  intervention  is  effective  in  altering 
interest differentials and exchange rates between managed economies and an 
integrated international capital market.  But shifts in the composition of reserves  
do not change exchange rates within the larger integrated market.      
             
While we use China/Asia and the renminbi as shorthand for the managed fixed 
rate region and its currency, we do not argue that China alone is large enough to 
dominate international interest and exchange rates.  However, we estimate that 
countries that actively manage their exchange rates comprise about one third of 
world GDP and savings.  The shock to the global system that we model is a 
substantial increase in savings rates and levels among this group. These are 
coupled with a decision of governments in the region to put a large share of the 
increase, about half, into foreign assets.  
 
We could extend the portfolio balance model as well to economic relationships 
within the international capital market, i.e. to the relations between the US and 
Euroland, but we do not do so for two reasons.  First, the reasons for rejecting 
this  model  in  the  past  are  still  very  powerful.    Second  a  three  zone  portfolio 
balance model is very difficult to work with, particularly when we are interested in 
studying the endogenous responses of exchange rates and real interest rates to 
various shocks.  Since such models have a low insight to equation ratio, we stick 
with the perfect substitutes model for the US and Euroland.  Our guess is that 
introducing a little bit of home bias in these portfolios will do little violence to our 
results.    
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